In recent decades, political science has turned to the study of agenda setting as a central aspect of collective decision-making environments. The content of the public agenda -and the issue agendas of political institutions -makes significant social change possible. 1 Recent studies suggest that these political institutions are engaged in both competitive relationships as they identify and pursue both active and latent public issues, and more complex cue-taking relationships. 2 For separated powers, the problems of cooperation and competition with one another are entwined with internal collective decision-making dilemmas.
In this study, we focus on the tension within a political institution between agenda setting as a mechanism for internal organizational maintenance, and agenda setting as a consequence of that institution's interaction with other branches of government and the general public. Specifically, we examine agenda setting by the United States Supreme
Court, and ask the question of why the Court allocates more or less of its valuable agenda space to one policy issue over others. Our study environment is the policy issue composition of the Court's docket: the Court's attention to criminal justice policy issues relative to other issues. Among the most important powers of the Court is the power to apportion its agenda space among policy issues.
Pacelle 3 argues that the Court's agenda-building process, its culling of cases and issues from numerous petitions, may represent the most important sequence of decisions the Court makes. But the Court's docket is a finite agenda space on which some issues are provided with a larger proportion of the Court's attention 4 . Allocating space to an issue can promote the issue's national visibility and legitimacy as an important public concern. 5 We model the Court's allocation of this agenda space as a function of internal organizational demands and external political signals. We find that this agenda responds to the issue priorities of the other branches of the federal government and the public. We also find that the Court's internal ideological balance influences issue prioritisation. In contrast, organizational maintenance considerations have no impact on the Court's allocation of its agenda.
In the next section of this study we outline the process of Supreme Court agenda setting as an institutional and organizational problem. We then model the Court's agenda as a function of both internal and external factors. Last, we present the model's results and offer conclusions.
AGENDA SETTING IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has great discretion in choosing cases and issues. 6 It serves as the arena for setting national legal policy and the cases that it chooses to decide have far reaching policy implications. The Court also sits at the apex of the federal judicial system and in its error correction capacity helps to ensure that the policies set by lower federal courts are broadly consistent with the Court's policy goals. Studies on Court case selection find that justices base granting certiorari on cues involving case characteristics, including the government's involvement as a petitioner, 7 conflicting decisions between lower courts, 8 and the filing of amicus briefs by interest groups. 9 Scholars also argue that certiorari decisions depend on justices' preferences and strategic action to further those preferences. 10 Collectively, these explanations are fundamentally limited in that they speak only to the Court's or a justice's decision to hear a case, and not the broader question of which policy issues merit the Court's time and attention. 4 The topic of issue agenda setting by the Court in the certiorari process has received less attention. Like the other two branches of government, the Court engages in issue agenda setting both to manage its internal decision-making process and to attain its public policy goals. Studies of the Court rarely capture these dual purposes in agenda setting and instead concentrate on one to the other's exclusion. Caldeira examines a series of bivariate relationships between the Court's issue agenda, its organizational and ideological concerns, and external influences, but does not address the relative importance of these two broad motivations. 11 Pacelle details the Court's changing attention following the Great Depression and New Deal reforms from economic matters to the "preferred position" of becoming a dominant player in civil liberties. 12 More recently, Flemming, et al. find that in certain circumstances the Court is responsive to the issue agenda priorities of Congress in setting its own agenda; 13 Flemming, et al.
recognize that the Court is engaged in competitive and collaborative relations with the other branches of government, so agenda setting is part of a complex process of cuetaking and consolidation of power. However, they do not address or control for the potential effects of organizational concerns or internal preferences on the Court's issue agenda allocation.
Our study combines both internal and external motivations to assess the weight of the Court's caseload, its own collective preferences, and the effect of external signals in determining its policy agenda. The Court may be attentive to the agenda priorities of the other branches and the general public while, simultaneously, its internal motivations constrain its issue attention. In doing so, this study bridges the micro-level analysis of the decision to grant certiorari to broader external constraints -the other branches and the public's attention itself. We argue that the Court may be attentive to the preferences of other political elites and the general public to accomplish a perception of fair governance. This premise, that members of the Court might take agenda priority cues from elite political actors and the public, is supported by studies that suggest the justices reference external concerns in their decisions. 20 The premise that members of the Court act in a strategic fashion and take stock of the preferences and priorities of external actors fits well with Kingdon's general conception of government officials as being politically-sensitive agenda setters who are exceedingly cognizant of the "political stream" of matters that are deemed politically relevant and worth addressing by other elite actors and the public. 21 We believe that the Court may be sensitive to the policy issue attentions of the president, Congress, and the public when formulating its own agenda. Our measure of the presidents' policy issue priority (Presidential Agenda) is the percentage of a president's yearly State of the Union Address devoted to the issue of criminal justice policy. 22 Light asserts that these are the primary indicators of presidential policy priorities. 23 A president spending more of his Address on an issue indicates that the president is "going public"
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and signalling other branches and the public that it should be carefully considered. 24 Our measure of Congress' attention to criminal justice issues (Congress Agenda) is the percentage of congressional hearings devoted to criminal justice issues in a given year.
Our measure is derived from Baumgartner and Jones' Congressional Hearings Data project, which summarizes information on all congressional hearings over time. 25 Our third external variable (Public Opinion) is the percentage of the public believing that crime is an important policy issue, as measured in public opinion surveys. Over the past five decades, scholars have debated whether the Court acts as a majoritarian or countermajoritarian institution. 26 Flemming and Wood make a persuasive case that the justices respond directly to public opinion, finding that justices respond to public opinion across numerous issues and within a relatively short time frame. 27 These external variables are lagged by one year to provide the necessary time for justices to process this information and consider it in forming the Court's agenda.
We counterbalance these external influences by accounting for the internal and organizational dynamics of the Court's agenda formation process. First, we account for the possibility that the Court sets its own agenda. In this view, the collective policy preferences of the justices dictate how much of the Court's attention will be spent on criminal justice issues. However, for aggregate-level analysis, this proposition is not a simple one. 28 Studies of justices' certiorari voting suggest that justices are interested in advancing their sincere preferences at the certiorari stage, but are strategic and want to be certain that the Court's decision on the merits will turn their way if a case is taken on for review. We suggest that while justices (whether liberal or conservative) may wish to make policy in the high profile issue area of criminal justice, they will be reluctant to take on cases when they are uncertain about the vote on the merits. A moderate Court, on which one or two swing votes might decide a case, provides less certainty for either liberals or conservatives. Hence, we propose that when the Court's composition is more ideologically extreme (or immoderate) there will be more certainty of outcomes, and it will apportion more agenda space to criminal justice issues.
We offer two measurement strategies here. 
DISCUSSION
Setting a political institution's issue agenda helps maintain decision making within the organization while providing a basis for broad social change. In a system of separated powers, agenda setting emphasizes institutional competition and cooperation.
But agenda setting also sets the scope of conflict, confers legitimacy to the concerns of affected populations, and -in practical effect -suppresses other concerns. 37 This study assesses how a national political institution balances institutional considerations, its 
Presidential Agenda
Percentage of the annual State of the Union address devoted to criminal justice issues. Similar to Cohen (1995) we counted the number of lines from the president's State of the Union Address devoted to criminal justice issues. We then divided this number by the total number of lines contained in the president's State of the Union Address for a given year to discern the percentage of the speech concerning criminal justice issues. Intercoder reliability for the measure was 95 percent. This variable is logged to account for high skew. 
Congress Agenda

Public Opinion
The percentage of respondents naming crime as the most important problem using the Gallup Poll's Most Important Problem facing the U.S. question (various years). This variable is logged to account for high skew.
Immoderate Court
The absolute value of the mean of the justices' ideological scores for a given term using the Segal et al. (1989; measure of justice ideology.
Critical Ideological Balance
This is a dichotomous variable with 1 representing that the value of Immoderate Court is one standard deviation above the mean or higher and 0 otherwise. 
CJ Adjudication Demand
General Adjudication Demand
The natural log of the total petitions for review before the Court in a given year. Source: Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director (various years). Table A1 provides the sample statistics for the variables examined in this study. Figure   A1 provides the time series for the dependent variable.
[Insert Table A2 for the tests.
[Insert Table A2 about here.]
Measures of Serious Crime Robustness Check
We also consider controls for the effect of the level of crime on the dependent variable. Consistent measures of crime are difficult to obtain over such a long time series (due to changes in record keeping methods), however we managed to construct two 
